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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
MOISES J. SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

Case No. 950273-CA

v.
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, UTAH STATE HIGHWAY
PATROL, and HAROLD C. CLEMENTS,

Priority No. 15

Defendants and Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE HIGHWAY PATROL
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a final order of the Second Judicial
District Court dated November 17, 1994, granting summary judgment
in favor of defendant-appellee Utah State Highway Patrol•

Utah

Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1994) grants this Court
jurisdiction to hear the appeal as transferred from the Supreme
Court of Utah.

ISSUE PRESENTED UPON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue for review is whether the district court
correctly held that defendant Utah State Highway Patrol had no
special relationship with plaintiff giving rise to an actionable
duty.

On appeal from a summary judgment# the reviewing court,

without deference to the trial court's rulings, determines "only
whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no

1

disputed issues of material fact." Ferree v. Stater 784 P.2d
149, 151 (Utah 1989).

In a negligence action, "[t]he issue of

whether a duty exists is entirely a question of law to be
determined by the [reviewing] court." Id.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES. AND RULES
All relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issue before the Court
is contained in the body of this brief.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings Below
Plaintiff, a bystander at the scene of a minor single-

vehicle traffic accident on a snow-packed freeway off-ramp,
brought suit in November of 1993 alleging, inter alia, that the
injuries he received when he was struck by a sliding car resulted
from the negligent failure of defendant Utah State Highway Patrol
("UHP") to adequately control the scene (R. 1-7). On October 28,
1994, the district court rendered summary judgment in favor of
UHP (R. 136-37).

The court dismissed UHP from the case by order

signed November 17 and entered November 25, 1994 (R. 145-47:
Addendum A, attached).

On December 6, 1994, plaintiff filed a

premature notice of appeal (R, 150-51) from the November 17 order
while action was still pending against the defendant driver of
the sliding vehicle.

This remaining claim was dismissed by

stipulation of the relevant parties in an order dated January 26
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and entered January 27, 1995 (R. 159).
The Supreme Court of Utah poured the premature appeal over
to this Court by order of February 3, 1995 (R. 160). On February
15, 1995, the Court entered a sua sponte motion for summary
disposition based on the ineffective notice of appeal (Addendum
B, attached).

On February 21, 1995, plaintiff filed a timely

notice of appeal (R. 162-63), and one week later moved to
voluntarily dismiss the earlier appeal (Addendum C, attached)•
The motion was granted the same day (R. 165).
On April 20, 1995, the supreme court poured over the second
appeal to this Court (R. 170).

B.

Statement of Relevant Facts
On December 30, 1992, plaintiff and his son stopped and

exited their trucks on the snow-packed 24th Street off-ramp of
northbound interstate highway 1-15 in Ogden, Utah, to render
assistance to another motorist whose van had slipped off the ramp
into the snow (R. 1 at 1 2; 63-64 at \ 1; 94 at 1 4).

UHP

Trooper Richard Taylor, en route to another accident, saw the men
on the ramp as he drove along the highway (R. 94 at 1 4).

He

stopped his patrol car on 1-15 above the exit and called to them,
telling them to leave the area due to the danger posed by the
snow (isLJ . They initially resisted the trooper's request (iiLJ .
He then approached them on foot, advising them against attempting
to pull the van from the snow due to their potential liability
for any damage to it, and informing them that he would call a tow
truck for the stranded motorist (idLl. At that time, they picked
3

up their equipment and began walking toward their trucks (id.).
Before they reached the trucks, another vehicle came down the
off-ramp, lost control on the snow, and struck plaintiff (id. at
1 5).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the "public duty/special duty" doctrine, a government
agency is not liable to a member of the public for injury caused
by negligence absent a breach of duty owed to him as an
individual.

The essence of a relationship creating a special

duty is dependence, as where one party assumes responsibility for
another's safety or deprives him of his normal opportunities for
self-protection.

An obligation owed to the public at large is

insufficient to create a special relationship giving rise to a
duty.
The undisputed facts of this case show no special
relationship between plaintiff and the highway patrol.

Trooper

Taylor, as a member of UHP, held a general duty to the public at
large to enforce traffic laws and ensure pedestrian safety.

In

advising plaintiff to leave the snow-slicked off-ramp, Trooper
Taylor acted within the scope of these general duties, neither
inducing plaintiff's reliance on the trooper's protection nor
depriving plaintiff of his normal opportunities to guard himself
from danger.

Because the facts do not support the existence of a

special relationship, the district court correctly granted
summary judgment in favor of UHP, and plaintiff has articulated
4

neither facts nor policy considerations which would justify a
reversal•

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE ACTIONS OF TROOPER TAYLOR DID NOT CREATE A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP WITH PLAINTIFF GIVING RISE TO AN
ACTIONABLE DUTY,
"To establish negligence or gross negligence, a plaintiff
must first establish a duty of care owed by the defendant to the

plaintiff." ferret, 784 p.2d at 151; ss& aJLsc Beach Vt
University of Utah. 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986); Qwens V,

Garfield, 784 p.2d ii87f 1189 (Utah 1989); Rollins v. Petersen,
813 P.2d 1156, 1159 (Utah 1991).

As both this Court and the

supreme court have held, "without a showing of duty, a plaintiff
cannot recover." Lamarr v. Utah State Dep!t of Transp.r 828 P.2d
535, 537-38 (Utah App. 1992); accord, Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1159;
Beash, 726 P.2d at 415.
With respect to a governmental entity, the duty cannot be
simply a public duty, but must be a duty owed to a particular
individual as the result of some special relationship:
For a governmental agency and its agents to be
liable for negligently caused injury suffered by a
member of the public, the plaintiff must show a breach
of a duty owed him as an individual, not merely the
breach of an obligation owed to the general public at
large by the governmental official.
Ferreef 784 P.2d at 151. Acknowledging the distinction, this
Court has noted that "[u]nder the public duty doctrine, ! a duty
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to all is a duty to none.'" Cannon v. University of ntahr 866
P.2d 586, 588 (Utah App. 1993), ££X£^flgniefl,879 P.2d 266 (Utah
1994) (citations omitted); £££ alS£ Qtt£Hfi, 784 P.2d at 1189, n.2
("Under the doctrine, the government is only liable if it owes a
special duty to the individual plaintiff beyond the general duty
owed to the public"); Obray v. Malmbarg, 26 Utah 2d 17, 484 P.2d
160, 162 (Utah 1971) ("[FJailure by a public sheriff to
investigate a crime claimed by an individual to have been
committed, ordinarily is a matter of judgment and discretion, not
actionable or compensable, and not pursuable by an individual
since the public official's duty is to the public . . .")
(footnote omitted).

Consequently, unless UHP owed some duty to

plaintiff beyond its duty to the general public, plaintiff cannot
recover.
It is clear that Utah subscribes to "the 'special relation1
analysis described in sections 314 through 320 of the Restatement

of Torts/1 Roll insf 813 p. 2d at 1159. The Rollins court
described the analysis as follows:
Section 315 sets out the general tort principle that
one has no duty to control the conduct of third
persons. -The Restatement then lists two exceptions to
this general rule. First, if "a special relation
exists between the actor and the third person," then
the actor has a duty to "control the third person1 s
conduct." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315 (1965).
Second, if "a special relation exists between the
actor" and the plaintiff, the plaintiff has "a right to
[the actor's] protection," presumably against harm from
third persons. IcL
Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1159.
Under the first exception to the general rule of
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nonliability, " [o]ne who takes charge of a third person whom he
knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others
if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to
control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965).

In the present case,

plaintiff has not alleged that Trooper Taylor had taken charge of
the injuring vehiclefs driver prior to the accident, or knew or
should have known that the driver would be likely to cause bodily
harm to others if not controlled.

This exception is inapplicable

to plaintiff's circumstances.
Under the second exception, "[o]ne who is required by law to
take or who voluntarily takes the custody of another under
circumstances such as to deprive the other of his normal
opportunities for protection is under a similar duty to the other
[to protect against unreasonable risk of physical harm]."
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314A(4) (1965).

Plaintiff has

not alleged that he was in Trooper Taylor's custody at any time,
nor do the facts suggest that the trooper deprived plaintiff of
his normal opportunities for protection.

As with the first

exception, plaintiff has articulated no facts that meet this
exception to the general nonliability rule.
In applying the special relationship analysis of Restatement
sections 14 through 20, the supreme court has agreed that tt[t]he
law imposes upon one party an affirmative duty to act only when
certain special relationships exist between the parties.

These

relationships generally arise when one assumes responsibility for
7

anotherfs safety or deprives another of his or her normal
opportunities for self-protection." fieach/ 726 P.2d at 415. An
examination of Utah precedent regarding special relationships in
the context of the public duty/special duty doctrine demonstrates
that under the undisputed facts of this case, Trooper Taylorfs
actions did not create a special relationship with plaintiff
giving rise to an actionable duty.
Plaintiff makes much of the supreme court's finding of a
duty in DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co.r 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983).
DCE is inapposite to the facts here. An action between private
parties, it involved no public entity and no question of public
duty.

Rather than relying on Restatement sections 14 through 20,

which the supreme court has held generally applicable in the
context of a public agency, it was analyzed under section 323,
which applies to the negligent performance of one who undertakes
to render services.

The duty in DCR was predicated on the

parties1 underlying contract for services: "Similarly,
contractual relationships for the performance of services impose
on each of the contracting parties a general duty of due care
toward the other, apart from the specific obligations of the
contract itself." DCE, 663 P.2d at 435.

Plaintiff has not

suggested any contractual relationship giving rise to a duty in
this case, nor has he addressed the effect of the public
duty/special duty doctrine on section 323.
More helpful to the analysis of the facts in this case are
precedents dealing with public entities and public safety.
8

In

Cannon, the plaintiffs, on their way to a university basketball
game, were injured when a car struck them as they crossed the
road between the university parking lot and the building housing
the event. Two police officers had been assigned by the
university to provide traffic control at the marked crosswalk
where the accident occurred, but at the time of the accident, the
officers were sitting in their patrol car, and the flares they
had placed at the crosswalk were burned out. Noting that "the
police officers1 duty, to enforce the traffic laws and ensure the
safety of pedestrian travel, was a general duty owed to the
public at large, not to any distinct group"

(Cannon, 866 P.2d at

589), the Court declined to find a special relationship between
the university and the plaintiffs that would entitle them to
relief.
Plaintiff attempts to distinguish Cannon on the basis that
"[t]he officers in Cannon did not interact individually with the
Cannons . . ." (Brief of Appellant at 11).

However, he points to

no authority for his implied proposition that interaction with an
identifiable member of the public is, by itself, sufficient to
convert a public duty to a special duty, and precedent belies
this theory.

In Christenson v. Hayward, 694 P.2d 612 (Utah

1984), sheriff's deputies were called to a disturbance at a
billiard hall involving a drunken patron.

Finding the drunken

man in the parking lot, they requested that he walk his
motorcycle from the location.

He complied, but was killed within

minutes while riding the vehicle and failing to negotiate a
9

curve.

The personal representative of the estate sued, claiming

that the death was due to the officers1 negligent failure to
arrest the decedent.

The supreme court declined to find an

actionable duty under these facts, favorably citing the analysis
applied by a California court:
Stout v. City of Porterville, 148 Cal. App. 3d
937, 196 Cal. Rptr. 301 (5 Dist. 1983), is apropos to
the question of whether the complaint states a cause of
action. It states:
The only additional duty undertaken by
accepting employment as a police officer is
the duty owed to the public at large . . . .
... Appellants did not allege that [the
officer] assured Michael Stout he would take
care of him or by his words or conduct
induced him to rely on the officer's
protection. Appellcints did not allege that
the officer in any way induced him into a
false sense of security. In sum, appellants
failed to allege a common law legal duty owed
to them by the City and/or [the officer].
(Citations omitted.)
Christenson, 694 P.2d at 613. Although the officers in
Christenson dealt directly and personally with an individual
whose abilities they believed to be compromised by alcohol, and
who therefore might be seen as dependent on their protection,
this fact was insufficient to demonstrate the plaintiff's
reliance on the officers, to show an actionable undertaking of
services to the plaintiff, or to create a special relationship
giving rise to a duty.
Trooper Taylor's brief interaction with plaintiff, whose
faculties were unimpaired, pales by comparison to the interaction
in Christensonf affording no grounds for a special relationship.
Asked in interrogatories to "state with particularity all that
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the Trooper did and all that he said between the time you first
saw him and the time of the collision with defendant Clements1
car" (R. 101) (emphasis supplied), plaintiff responded:
When UHP Trooper Taylor was on his way to another
accident and he saw us trying to help the lady get her
van out, he yelled from Interstate 15 to my son and me
that if we could get our vehicles out to go on home
because it was dangerous with all the snow on the road.
We yelled back and told him we were just trying to
help. He did not hear us so he came down to where we
were and told us not to pull the van out ourselves
because if there was any damage done by us to the van,
we would be liable for it. He said he would call a tow
truck because they were insured. At that time, my son,
Morris, and I picked up our chains and headed back to
our trucks. From then on, I do not remember what else
happened. I did not know I'd been hit by the
defendant's car.
R. 101-02.

Trooper Taylor's actions, as described by plaintiff,

do not support plaintiff's contention that the trooper "took
control of the scene" (Brief of Appellant at 11) in a way that
induced plaintiff's reliance on the trooper's protection.

At

most, they show the trooper's performance of a general public
duty to enforce traffic laws and assure pedestrian safety--the
duty this Court explicitly found insufficient to support a
special relationship in Cannon,
Plaintiff argues that
[h]ad Sanchez refused to comply with the trooper's
order, or had the trooper simply continued past the
scene, Sanchez would have been near the van he was
assisting when the other vehicle came off the ramp and
slid off the road, instead of walking away from
oncoming traffic, unable to see and appreciate the
danger.
Brief of Appellant at 7-8.

This contention ignores the fact that

had he not resisted Trooper Taylor's initial request to leave the
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scene, he would have been out of harm's way long before the
arrival of the vehicle that injured him.

More importantly, while

plaintiff claims to have "relied upon the trooper's assumption of
control" (Brief of Appellant at 11), he does not claim to have
been in the trooper's custody.

He points to no assurances by

Trooper Taylor that the trooper would take care of him and no
words or conduct that induced him to rely on the trooper's
protection or gave him a false sense of security.

To the

contrary, as plaintiff admits, the trooper specifically apprised
him of the danger to which the snowy conditions exposed him (R.
101), an action which should have alerted plaintiff to the need
for caution and attentiveness to his own safety.

He does not

show that Trooper Taylor assumed responsibility for his safety or
deprived him of his normal opportunities to protect himself.

He

does not assert that Trooper Taylor's actions interfered with his
ability to observe traffic and respond appropriately.

In short,

he provides no basis for differentiating himself from the general
public to which Trooper Taylor owed a public duty.

The actions

taken by Trooper Taylor to fulfill that duty do not, under the
precedents of Utah's appellate courts, demonstrate a special
relationship with plaintiff supporting liability in this case.
POINT II
PUBLIC POLICY WOULD NOT BE SERVED BY FINDING A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
Whether a special relationship exists is an "essentially
pragmatic" analysis (Rollins. 813 P.2d at 1160).
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In Beach, the

supreme court stated:
Determining whether one party has an affirmative
duty to protect another from the other's own acts or
those of a third party requires a careful consideration
of the consequences for the parties and society at
large. If the duty is realistically incapable of
performance, or if it is fundamentally at odds with the
nature of the parties1 relationship, we should be loath
to term the relationship "special" and to impose a
resulting "duty," for it is meaningless to speak of
"special relationships" and "duties" in the abstract.
Beach/ 726 P.2d at 418. This Court has addressed the policy
considerations underlying the special relationship analysis
specifically as applied to government officials:
[W]hen the government deals generally with the welfare
of all, it does so without a duty to anyone, unless
there is a "special relationship" between the
government and the individual. Absent such a doctrine,
the government would be discouraged from adequately
providing any general protections or services for the
public.
Cannon. 866 P.2d at 589 (citation omitted).
Plaintiff contends that public policy supports recognition
of his special relationship with UHP under the facts of this
case.

He suggests that holding police officers to a duty of

reasonable care in using their authority is not an unreasonable
burden.

In support of his argument, plaintiff relies on DCR and

Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (Utah 1966).

His

reliance on these cases is misplaced.
In Hower the supreme court faced the question whether an
ambulance driver should be held negligent as a matter of law in a
collision with Howe's vehicle.

The court did not address the

issue of whether a duty was, in fact, owed to the plaintiff;

13

assuming the duty, the court simply held that the trial court had
adequately protected the plaintifffs interests by instructing the
jury of the ambulance driver's obligation to use reasonable care
under the circumstances. £s£ 421 P.2d at 161. The opinion did
not mention or discuss the special relationship doctrine.
D£R, as previously discussed (see Point I, supra)r involved
a duty predicated on an underlying contractual relationship and
is therefore distinguishable from the present case. Moreover,
D£R did not involve government entities and the concomitant
public service concerns apparent in the line of cases represented
by Cannon, and therefore did not address the public duty/special
duty doctrine.

Its factual inconsistency with plaintiff's

circumstances vitiates its precedential value here.
As plaintiff acknowledges (see Brief of Appellant at 12-13),
the supreme court held in Ferree that "[t]he public interest
would not be served by imposing liability on corrections
officials and the state for the uncertain success that attends
parole and probation programs/" 784 P.2d at 151, even though the
failure of those programs can lead to tragic results--in Eexr££,
the bludgeoning and death of an innocent victim.

Although

plaintiff argues that the policy concerns attending Ferree do not
apply to his circumstances, he has failed to recognize that other
public interests may weigh as heavily in a pragmatic analysis.
Analyzing the pragmatic concerns in Cannon, this Court
concluded that
to adopt the Cannons1 theory that they were part of a
14

distinct group of pedestrians on their way to a
basketball game would impose too broad a duty on the
University and its police officers. It would expose
the University to liability to every person injured in
any accident that occurs while on the way to any
University event. In the face of such exposure, the
likely result would be for the University to stop
providing any sort of traffic enforcement. Thus, the
public interest would not be served by imposing
liability on the University and its police officers in
this case.
Cannon, 866 P.2d at 590# n.3. The pragmatic concerns in the
present case are analogous.

To adopt plaintifffs theory, that

his transient interaction with a police officer created a special
relationship, would impose too broad a duty on the state.

It

would expose the state to liability every time a person was
injured in an accident after contact with police, regardless of
the nature of that contact.

The likely outcome would be for

police to stop intervening where the actions of motorists and
pedestrians, however well-intended, may pose a potential danger.
This result would be detrimental to the public interest in
traffic safety and accident prevention.

Contrary to plaintiff's

conclusion, the duty plaintiff seeks to impose--a duty explicitly
rejected by this Court in Cannon--is not "already well-entrenched
in Utah law" (Brief of Appellant at 13) , regardless of how much
he may wish it to be.
Plaintiff's public policy argument fails to fairly weigh the
competing policy considerations relevant to the special
relationship analysis or to take cognizance of controlling
precedent in a factually analogous case. He has neither
acknowledged the Court's prior balancing of policy interests in

15

Cannon nor offered a justification for ignoring it. His desire
to escape the result of this precedent simply does not warrant
the outcome he seeks.

CONCLUSION
Plaintifffs argument for recognition of a special
relationship with UHP giving rise to an actionable duty under the
circumstances of this case is unsupported in policy and
contradicted by precedent.

By engaging in performance of his

public duty of traffic enforcement, Trooper Taylor did nothing to
induce plaintiff's reliance on his protection or to disable
plaintiff from protecting himself.

Plaintiff has articulated no

facts which set him apart from the public at large or provide
grounds for reversal of the district court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of the highway patrol.
For these reasons, defendant Utah State Highway Patrol
respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
decision.

REQUEST RS ORAL ARGUMENT AND/OR PUBLISHED OPINION
Defendant does not believe oral argument is necessary to the
disposition of this casef but desires to participate if oral
argument is ordered by the Court.

However, defendant believes

that the facts of this case provide helpful guidance in
clarifying Cannon and properly applying the public duty/special
duty analysis to traffic enforcement activities. Defendant

16

therefore respectfully requests publication of the Court's
opinion•

Dated t h i s f ^ H i \

day of August, 1995.

NanCy^. Kemp
Assistant Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this
, day of August, 1995,
I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a true and accurate copy
of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to the following:
Erik M. Ward
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw
635 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
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MOISES J. SANCHEZ,
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
Plaintiff,
vs.
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION, UTAH
STATE HIGHWAY PATROL and
HAROLD C. CLEMENTS,

Civil No. 930900509
Judge W. Brent West

Defendants.

This matter came before the Court on defendant Utah State
Highway Patrol's Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Court, having reviewed the memoranda submitted on behalf
of plaintiff and defendant and having heard oral argument, now
rules as follows:
There is no disputed issue of material fact. The only dispute
is over the legal significance of the facts.
Based

on the

facts of

this case, there

is no special
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relationship established between the Plaintiff and Trooper Taylor.
As such, Trooper Taylor owed no duty of care towards the Plaintiff.
For the reasons stated above, the Court enters the following
Order:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
Defendant Utah State Highway Patrol's Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted and Plaintiff's Complaint is hereby dismissed
with prejudice.
DATED t h i s

^

day o f

f^\fl*rvt?i/

, 1994.

BY THE COURT:

iVhlUkMhS:
W. BRENT WEST
District Court Judge
Approved as to form:

gjkty lOJl

ERIK WARD
Attorney f

Attorney for Defendant Clements
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing ORDER OF DISMISSAL, postage prepaid, this g>
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Attorney for Plaintiff
635 25th Street
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Attorney for Defendant Clements
10 Exchange Place, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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Moises J. Sanchez,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

SUA SPONTE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISPOSITION

v*
Case No. 950090-CA
State of Utah, Department of
Transportation; Utah State
Highway Patrol; and Harold C.
Clements,
Defendants and Appellees.

TO THE ABOVE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS:
A docketing statement has been filed with the Court of
Appeals in the above-captioned case. This case is being
considered for summary dismissal, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure 10(e), on the grounds that the notice of
appeal was filed from a non-final order since it preceded entry
of an order dismissing plaintiff's claims against defendant
Clements. In lieu of a brief, each party shall file a
memorandum, not to exceed ten pages, explaining why summary
disposition should, or should not, be granted by the court.
Failure to respond may result in the granting of this motion.
An original and four copies of the memorandum should be
filed with the clerk of the Utah Court of Appeals on or before
February 28, 1995.
DATED this /$

day of February, 1995.

$U&& 0, %e~JL
R u s s e l l W. Bench, Judge
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I hereby certify that on the 15th day of February, 1995, a true
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Erik M. Ward
Gridley, Ward, Havas, Hamilton & Shaw
Attorneys at Law for Appellant
635 - 25th Street
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Barbara E. Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
Jan Graham
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By
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ERIK M. WARD (3380)
GRIDLEY, WARD, HAVAS, HAMILTON & SHAW
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant
635 - 25th Street
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 801-621-3317

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH

MOTION TO DISMISS
APPEAL and MEMORANDUM
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION

MOISES J . SANCHEZ,
Plaintiff/Appellant,

Appellate Court No. 9405079

vs.
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
TRANSPORTATION, UTAH STATE
HIGHWAY PATROL and HAROLD
C. CLEMENTS,
Defendants/Appellees.

Plaintiff/Appellant in the above-entitled action respectfully moves the court to
dismiss this appeal on grounds that Notice of Appeal filed December 6, 1994 was
untimely. An order dismissing defendant Harold C. Clements was entered by the trial
court on January 26, 1995, and a timely Notice of Appeal has subsequently been filed
with the court.
DATED this 28th day of February, 1995.

Vi Erik M. Ward
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY/MAILING
I HEREBY CERT/FY that on this 28th day of February, 1995, I mailed, postage
prepaid and first class mail, a true and correct copy of the foregoing MOTION TO
DISMISS APPEAL AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION to:
Barbara Ochoa
Assistant Attorney General
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

